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The very different factor endowments of the New World to those found in Europe 
implied that the wine industry developed its own style and characteristics. In California 
production was located at a considerable distance from the main markets on the East 
Coast, and trade was initially controlled by the East Coast merchants, who imported 
wines from Europe and purchased California wine in bulk, selling it under their own 
brands. The problems of marketing and the fight against fraud and adulteration, produced 
a struggle between the wine-makers and San Francisco’s merchants for the control of the 
industry, and the creation of the world’s largest, vertically integrated wine company, the 
California Wine Association. 
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Wine production in Europe today is dominated by small family vineyards and co-
operative wineries, while in the New World viticulture and viniculture is highly 
concentrated and vertically integrated. This paper argues that in California these 
organisational differences have historical explanations. Technological change radically 
altered the nature of the world’s wine industry before 1919, and in particular allowed the 
commercial production of drinkable table wines in geographical regions which previously 
had been considered too difficult. New production technologies also provided the 
opportunity for greater economies of scale and vertical integration. As technological 
change endangered existing rents, growers, wine-makers, and merchants lobbied 
governments to introduce laws and create new institutions that regulated markets in their 
favour. In Europe the political influence of the hundreds of thousands of small growers 
forced their governments to intervene in markets to protect their interests and restrict the 
economic power of merchants. By contrast, in California the potential electoral vote of 
the growers was much smaller, and the large distances between the best land for vines 
and the major urban markets encouraged San Francisco’s merchants to integrate 
horizontally and vertically. Attempts by grape-growers and wine-makers to oppose this 
move and deal directly with the East Coast merchants, thereby excluding the local 
merchants, failed.  
Despite a number of early attempts such as by the French Huguenots in Florida or 
the British settlers in Virginia, wine-making was commercially irrelevant virtually 
everywhere in the New World until the mid-nineteenth century. The major problems 
facing the industry included the very low population densities in the future areas of 
specialized viticulture; the huge distances between these areas and population centres; the 
complexity of choosing the correct European vines to the very different conditions in the 
New World; and the universally poor quality of the wines produced. Despite some 
contemporaries’ hopes during the second half of the nineteenth century, especially during 
the wine shocks caused by powdery mildew and phylloxera, that they would be able to 
supply Europe with cheap beverage wines, the reality was that the New World wine 
industry in this period remained one of import substitution. Tariffs allowed wine 
production to grow rapidly in the New World in the thirty or forty years prior to 1914, by 
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which time Argentina had become the world’s seventh largest producer, Chile the ninth, 
the United States the tenth, and Australia, the eighteenth. 
 The very different factor endowments of the New World implied that the wine 
industry developed its own style and characteristics. In particular, growers had to adapt to 
very different factor endowments as, unlike their European counterparts, they were 
blessed with potentially large areas of cheap land suitable for the vine, but an acute 
shortage of labour. Wages for unskilled labour in France in 1910 for example were only 
75 per cent of those found in Argentina, 52 per cent of levels in Australia, and 42 per cent 
in the United States.1 Capital markets were weak for wine producers everywhere, 
although by the late nineteenth century these favoured the New World capitalists more 
than the small scale European producers. New World producers also faced the additional 
problem in that they needed to create a mass market for wines as many inhabitants, 
especially in the United States and Australia, were traditionally not wine drinkers. In this 
respect they faced similar marketing problems as those European producers who tried to 
sell their wines in distant, non-producer countries such as Britain.  While per capita wine 
consumption in Argentina in 1914 was not so different from levels found in countries 
such as Spain and Portugal, in the United States it remained considerably lower and little 
more than in Britain. This was not because wine producing technologies and marketing 
methods were superior in Argentina, but rather because a considerably higher percentage 
of their population and therefore potential consumers originated from wine drinking 
nations.  
This paper considers three inter-related problems which the industry needed to 
resolve in the 1880s. Production was still essentially small scale and using grape growing 
and wine-making techniques which were more suited to northern Europe, and which 
resulted in the production of poor quality wines which did not keep for long. Second, 
while many growers were ignorant of the subtleties of grape and wine-making, most of 
their potential consumers were also unacquainted with how good wines should taste. The 
task of improving production technologies, and educating drinkers was inter-related.2 
Finally, production in California was located at a considerable distance from the main 
                                                 
1 (Williamson 1995), pp.178-81. Figures are for unskilled urban building workers. 
2 The situation was repeated after Prohibition. See especially (Lapsley 1996). 
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markets on the East Coast. Wine drinkers on the East Coast had been traditionally been 
served by European imports, and a distribution network was already established, and East 
Coast bottlers looked to California for bulk wine which they then sold under their own 
brands. They tried to resist attempts by Californian producers to control the commodity 
chain for themselves. After a brief long-run survey of the industry, the paper is organized 
in three sections. The first shows that despite very different factor endowments, small 
growers predominated in California just as they did in Europe; the second considers 
technological transfer from Europe and the developments in grape and wine production; 
and the final section shows how the problems of marketing and the fight against fraud 
and adulteration, which led to a struggle between the wine-makers and San Francisco’s 
merchants for control of the industry, and the creation of the world’s largest, vertically 
integrated wine company, the California Wine Association. 
 
1. Californian wine in the nineteenth century 
The early history of wine in the United States was very different on the East coast to 
that of the West. The attempts to plant European vines (Vitis vinifera) on the East coast 
failed, sometimes because of the excessively harsh winters for the cold-sensitive 
European vine; on other occasions because of endemic cryptogrammic diseases, such as 
downy and powdery mildew, anthracnose, black rot, etc., which thrived in areas of high 
humidity; and sometimes because of the native root louse, phylloxera.3  From the late 
eighteenth century a number of new vines appeared east of the Rockies, which were 
either domestications of native American species (V.labrusca and V.rotundifolia), or 
naturally occurring hybrids between American and European varieties, such as Concord 
or Catawba. These varieties were often resistant to the fungus diseases and could 
withstand the harsh winters, but produced a strong disagreeable ‘foxy’ flavour in the 
wine. Some of the labrusca hybrids were also not very resistant to phylloxera. As the 
grapes were naturally low in sugar and high in acidity, sugar and water were added, 
although by the second half of the nineteenth century merchants could also blend these 
wines with those produced in California. 
                                                 
3 (Amerine 1981), pp.1-3, on which this paragraph is based. 
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 Viticulture was introduced into Baja California by the missions, the first of which 
was founded in San Diego in 1769, although the earliest reference to the planting of 
grapes dates from 1779, at San Juan Capistrano mission.4 The grape used was the 
Mission, a European vine which produced a dry wine of poor quality, but an acceptable 
sweet one. After the missions were secularized in 1833, the vineyards became neglected 
and abandoned. Although privately owned vineyards began to appear as early as 1818, 
the size of the industry was kept small by California’s very limited population, just 
14,000 inhabitants on the eve of the gold rush. By 1852 it had jumped to a quarter of a 
million, and as powdery mildew hit Europe’s vineyards, the California Farmer declared 
in 1855 that ‘California may become the vineyard of the world’, and the California 
Horticulture Society noted that the State possessed ten million acres of potential 
vineyards, and that in Europe the wine industry employed directly and indirectly five 
million people.5 Viticulture grew rapidly, so that while the United States imported about 
thirty-eight times more wine than it produced in 1840, by 1886 the amount of domestic 
wines consumed was nearly four times as great as the wine imported.6 California wine 
output quadrupled between 1866/9 and 1883/6, doubling again by 1898/01, and once 
more a decade later in 1909/12 (Table 1 and Figure 1). On the eve of the First World War 
output stood at 2.16 million hectolitres, of which 44 per cent was dessert wine (wines 
which had been fortified with brandy), and 56 per cent ordinary beverage wines.7 By 
1913, California had 134 thousand hectares of grapes, 69 thousand of which were for 
wine, 45 thousand for raisins, and 20 thousand for table grapes. It was estimated that 
15,000 heads of families were directly engaged in viticulture, with many more being 
employed in wine-making and ancillary industries.8 The United States, or essentially 
California, had gone from producing virtually no wine to producing as much as a country 
such as Germany. Although the increase in production was reasonably constant and faster 
than population growth, the industry experienced some very sharp cyclical fluctuations in 
its prosperity. 
                                                 
4(Pinney 1989), p.238, who also argues that viticulture probably was not practiced before this date. 
5 (Leggett 1941), p.68, and (Pinney 1989) (1989, p.262). 
6 (Peninou, Unzelman, and Anderson 1998) pp.255-6 and (Crampton 1888),  p.184. 
7 Beverage wines are often referred to in the literature as ‘dry’, and fortified wines as ‘sweet’.  
8 (California and Board of State Viticultural Commissioners 1914), pp.2 and 4. 
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Table 1 
Production of wine in California9 
 
 Area of vines 
hectares 
Wine 
production 
000s hectolitres 
Yields 
Hectolitres / 
hectare 
1880 14,575    297 20 
1890 36,539    621 17 
1900 34,818 1,052 30 
1910 58,704 1,751 30 
 
Figure 1 
US and California wine production, 1871-191210 
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9 Area of vines, (Sullivan 1998), p.48. These estimates exclude the area for table grapes and raisin. Figures 
are very approximate. See also (Peninou, Unzelman, and Anderson 1998). Production: five year averages; 
(California. State Board of Agricultural 1912), p.191 and (California. State Agricultural Society 1915), 
p.139. 
10(United States. Dept. of 1916), p.701, (California. State Board of Agricultural 1912), pp.191 and 199 and 
(California. State Agricultural Society 1915), pp.139 and 142. 
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2. Viticulture in a land abundant and labour scarce economy 
In the nineteenth century most European vineyards were small in size and scattered 
around fairly heavily populated villages. Vines were usually worked by their owners and 
the use of wage labour was rare except for the harvest. The growth of large-scale 
viticulture in the Midi (and Algeria) provides an important exception, but the heavy 
demand for skilled, seasonal wage labour reinforced the economic viability of the small 
family farm, rather than eliminating it.11 The problem facing growers in the New World 
were very different, as not only were population densities considerably lower than in 
Europe, but the local population was unaccustomed to viticulture and wine-making. 
Furthermore viticulture was risky, and the four or five year delay after planting before the 
first harvest discouraged the commercial production of grapes. In California the main 
centre of production was originally around Los Angeles where the Mission grape was 
found, a grape suited for the production of fortified sweet wines in the hot southern 
climate, especially when wine-making skills were poor, but not for fine wines. However, 
the major market was considerably further north in San Francisco, and this geographical 
separation created considerable marketing problems for growers. The population of Los 
Angeles, which increased from just 1,610 inhabitants in 1850 to 11,183 as late as 1880, 
was very small compared to San Francisco, which saw its population increase from 
34,776 to 233,959 between the same dates.12  
As the population increased rapidly, so too did the demand for wines. Imported wine 
from Europe was very expensive, especially before the transport improvements of the 
second half of the century. Instead, a number of attempts were made by merchants to 
increase the supply of local wine by attracting growers who would plant vines. Perhaps 
the first was the firm Kohler & Frohling which dominated the Los Angeles wine trade in 
the mid 1850s, and which bought and crushed grapes produced on some 142 hectares of 
vineyards each year.13 To increase local wine supplies further, Kohler and Frohling, 
together with two other promoters, established a co-operative at Anaheim, some 32 
kilometres south of Los Angeles. The co-operative allocated fifty plots of eight hectares 
                                                 
11 (Simpson forthcoming) 
12 (Carter et al. 2006), vol.1, p.110. 
13 Although others grew the grapes and often owned the winery, it was Kohler & Frohling’s workers who 
were responsible for the harvest and making the wine. (Pinney 1989), pp.254-6, for a description of their 
wine making activities. See also (Carosso 1951) 
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for settlers, and set aside more land for housing, schools and other public uses. Between 
1857 and 1859, the society paid $20,000 for 22,789 days of field work in the preparation 
of the vineyards, fencing and digging irrigation ditches. The vine-growers were from 
Germany, and they continued to live and work in San Francisco while the preparatory 
work was being carried out. They were a diverse group, but with little or no practical 
knowledge of grape growing. Once the vineyards were established, the co-operative was 
ended and soon there were 47 individual winemaking properties, although the colony 
maintained a strong communal spirit. A further 600 hectares were added in the early 
1870s to meet the needs of the rising population, with most of it being planted with vines. 
Initially Kohler and Frohling purchased almost exclusively all the wine, and output 
jumped from 11 thousand hectolitres in 1864 to 47 thousand in 1884. This however was 
the last good harvest before a mysterious new vine disease, subsequently named Pierce’s 
disease, killed virtually all the vines, forcing the growers to switch to walnuts and 
oranges instead.14  
The rapid growth of San Francisco following the gold rush also encouraged 
merchants to search for local supplies of wine, the most important perhaps being the 
Italian-Swiss Colony. This was originally conceived as a grape growing co-operative, 
ostensibly to solve unemployment problems among Italian and Italian-Swiss in the city.15 
Its founder was Andrea Sbarboro, a native of Genova and he proposed to pay the workers 
part of their wages in company shares, making them partners in the project. In 1881 some 
600 hectares of land were bought north of Sonoma in a village named after the Piedmont 
wine town of Asti. As a co-operative, the scheme failed as the workers rejected their 
shares and insisted on receiving full wages, so the business was run as a joint stock 
company, but with a strong paternalistic tendency.16 The Italian-Swiss Colony prospered 
at wine making, and integrated forward into distribution, selling its chianti type wine in 
raffia covered bottles imported from Italy, under its ‘Tipo’ label. The driving force 
behind the Colony was a Piedmontese chemist, Pietro Rossi, who was one of the first to 
establish a laboratory in a Californian winery to control wine quality. Although the 
Italian-Swiss Colony lost its independence as a marketing agency in 1898 when it was 
                                                 
14 (Carosso 1951), pp.60-7 and (Pinney 1989), pp.285-94. 
15 (Palmer 1965), p.251-75. 
16 (Pinney 1989), p.328. 
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forced to sell half its stock to the California Wine Association, it continued to prosper, 
and by 1911 had an annual output of 225 thousand hectolitres from eight different 
wineries.17 
There were also a number of very large private estates. One of the first was Agoston 
Haraszthy’s Buena Vista vineyard, where in the late 1850s cellars were dug over 70 
metres into the hillsides, and by the early 1860s there were over 160 hectares of vines. 
Haraszthy believed it to be the largest vineyard in the United States, although he was 
forced to look for outside capital and the whole project failed shortly afterwards.18 The 
Buena Vista was relatively modest compared to Leland Stanford’s Vina Ranch located 
between Red Bluff and Chico, which had 1,450 hectares under vines by 1887, although 
all the 64 thousand hectolitres of wine produced in 1890 had to be distilled because of its 
poor quality.19 Stanford’s original purpose was to produce a cheap light dry wine, but the 
land was too fertile and climate too hot, and instead it specialised in the production of 
brandy and sweet wines, with the brandies winning a high reputation.20 Other large 
vineyards included the Italian Vineyard Company, that had 800 hectares of vines in a 
single field near Cucamonga in the early 1890s, and the Riverside Vineyard Company 
with 1,000 hectares of vines.21  
The labour requirements for planting new vineyards, constructing wineries and 
cellars, and building roads were immense. New investment came in waves at times of 
high wine prices during the short periods of rapid expansion.  For example, between 1877 
and 1887, California’s production jumped from 150 thousand hectolitres to 579 thousand, 
and in Napa alone the number of wineries increased in ten years from 49 (in 1881) to 166 
(in 1891).22  In 1889 Edward Roberts estimated that the 5,000 vineyards or so in 
California employed some 30,000 to 40,000 men in ‘cultivating, picking, storing, 
pressing bottling and in otherwise caring for the crop and preparing the wine for the 
                                                 
17 Rossi was behind the rival California Wine-Makers’ Corporation which failed that year. Rossi became a 
director of the CWA. See below.  
18 (Pinney 1989), p.277. 
19 (Pinney 1989) pp.321-5. The Vina Ranch became part of the endowment of Stanford University and was 
eventually sold and the vines were uprooted. 
20 (Husmann 1899) p.561. 
21 (Husmann 1903), p. 417. 
22 (Heintz 1977), pp.16 and 18. 
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consumers’.23 Until the last decade or so of the nineteenth century, a significant part of 
this labour force was provided by Chinese. 
The Chinese, at least initially, had a reputation as being cheap, hard working, and 
quick to learn, and by the late 1880s had come to dominate the State’s wine labour 
market. Controversy had surrounded the use of Chinese labour from the beginning, but it 
was widely recognized that some form of cheap labour was required if California was 
going to develop its huge agricultural potential. Both Haraszthy and Stanford used large 
quantities of Chinese on their huge estates. However, the passing of the Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882, which both restricted the entry of new Chinese and prohibited the 
naturalization of those that had arrived, together with the growing hostility towards them, 
effectively ended the flow of new immigrants, and the Chinese population in California 
dropped from 75 thousand in 1880 to 46 thousand by 1900.24 The problem was especially 
acute on the large estates, and one contemporary suggested that growers were in the same 
predicament as the cotton planters had been after Civil War, and believed that many of 
the vineyards would also end up being subdivided and worked as small farms.25 By the 
late 1880s Chinese labour had become scarce, and no longer considered cheap, and 
growers looked to a new group of immigrants – the Italians, who sometimes also brought 
vine growing skills with them. Between 1890 and 1910 California’s Italian population 
quadrupled from 15 thousand to over 60 thousand.  
From the start, California’s large vineyards and wineries were designed to save on 
labour costs. To facilitate cultivation, vines were often located on the plain, and planted 
in long straight rows. The rich soils had the potential advantage of producing higher 
yields than on the hillsides, a fact which growers exploited as the price differential 
between the shy and heavy bearers was not sufficient in most areas to encourage the 
production of fine wines. With about 2,500 to the hectare, vineyards were extensively 
planted compared to most of those found in Europe, and the two wide rows of between 
2.1 and 2.4 metres each, allowed a horse to plough with two or three furrows in both 
directions. By the end of the century this had changed so that in most modern vineyards 
the vines were being planted with one row about 1.8 metres wide, and the other diagonal 
                                                 
23 (Roberts 1889), cited in (Heintz 1977), p.36. 
24 (Heintz 1977), p.50. 
25 (Hilgard 1884), p.5. 
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row 3 metres, permitting the use of double plough teams on the wider row.26 The rapidly 
growing farm implements business of California led to new specialized equipment being 
produced for the vine, including gang ploughs with up to four shares to stir the middle of 
the row. A variety of methods of training the vines were adapted, but not those that which 
obstructed cultivation such as were in ‘vogue in Germany, France and other countries’.27 
According to the historian Vincent Carosso, viticulture in California actually used less 
labour per hectare than ‘many other crops’.28 By the turn of the century a single man was 
able to work a good, well-cultivated vineyard in full production of eight hectares, with 
hired labour needed only for the harvest. 
The early 1880s saw a rapid increase in the construction of commercial wineries, 
using designs to save on the use of labour. They were cut deep into the hillsides and 
grapes were taken by horses and wagons to the top floor for crushing. Where this was not 
possible, grapes were moved by an elevator. Gravity brought the juice to the fermenting 
vats, and finally to the bottom of the winery to mature.29 Hand pumps were labour 
intensive, and wine-makers started investing large sums at the turn of the century to 
introduce gasoline and then electricity generators. Pumping was crucial, not just to move 
wine from one barrel to another, but also to pump cool water through copper tubes to 
reduce the temperature of the fermenting must.30  
Yet although California had a number of very large vineyards, the vast majority of 
them were small, family farms, and many growers used part of their land and labour for 
other activities.31 George Husmann in his Grape culture and wine making in California 
(1888) noted that: 
We have thousands, perhaps the large majority of our wine growers, however, who 
are comparatively poor men, many of whom have to plant their vineyards, nay, even 
clear the land for them with their own hands, make their first wine in a wooden 
shanty with a rough lever press, and work their way up by slow degrees to that 
competence which they hope to gain by the sweat of their brow. Of these, many bring 
but a scanty knowledge to their task ….32 
                                                 
26 (Husmann 1896), p.194. See also Charles Krug in RBSVC for 1887, p.45. The density of vines was still 
almost double what it would be in 1970. James Lapsley, private communication. 
27 (Husmann 1896), p.219. 
28 (Carosso 1951), p.19. 
29 (Heintz 1999), p.102. 
30 (Heintz 1999), p.211 
31 (Pinney 1989), p.337. 
32 (Husmann 1888), p.iii.  
 12
 
Table 2 
 
Vineyards and wineries in Napa and Sonoma, 189133 
 
Size of 
holdings 
in hectares 
Number of 
holdings 
Total area 
of vines in 
hectares 
% of all 
vines in 
this 
category 
Number of 
wineries 
% of 
holdings 
with 
winery 
Hectares 
per winery
0 – 4 398   1252.6     7.7 26   6.5 48 
4 – 8 445   2947.0   18.2 56 12.6 53 
8 -16 311   3843.7   23.7 88 28.3 44 
16 – 25 100   2134.4   13.2 32 32.0 67 
25 + 120   6033.6   37.2 82 68.3 74 
Total 1374 16211.3 100.0 284 20.7 57 
 
In 1889 there were an estimated 65,000 hectares of vines and 5,000 growers 
producing grapes for both wine and the table, giving an average holding of 13 hectares.34 
When wine production alone is considered then the detailed survey of 1891 shows that 
there were approximately 2,750 growers with more than two hectares (five acres) of vines 
covering an area of thirty five thousand hectares.35 For Napa and Sonoma, which at this 
time accounted for 46 per cent of the area of California’s vines destined to wine 
production, the average holding was 12 hectares, slightly less than the State average of 13 
hectares. In these two counties, there were 531 holdings larger than eight hectares, but 
these accounted for three-quarters of all the vines, and the largest 220 with more than 16 
hectares occupied half the total area (Table 2). In total, there were 41 vineyards with 
more than 50 hectares (125 acres) representing a fifth of the total area, and 85 per cent of 
                                                 
33 (California.  Board of State Viticultural Commissioners 1891). My calculations. 
34 (Roberts 1889), p.199. The figure includes vines for table grapes and raisin. (Sullivan 1998) gives a 
figure of 36,500 hectares for vines at this time. 
35 (California.  Board of State Viticultural Commissioners 1891) The figures in this source are approximate 
with the size of many vineyards being rounded to 10, 15, 20 acres, etc. Only on occasions are holdings 
given as having young vines not yet in production (which have been excluded from Table 2). Clearly some 
growers switched between producing grapes for the table or for wine according to market prices. 
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them had their own wineries.36 At the other extreme, 61 per cent of holdings accounted 
for 26 per cent of the vines, but only one in ten had their own wineries. If growers with 
less than two hectares are included, then the extremes in property ownership are even 
greater. In Sonoma for example, there were 9,068 hectares of vineyards cultivated in 815 
holdings of over two hectares, but these statistics exclude ‘at least five hundred acres of 
small vineyards of less than five acres (two hectares), planted for family use’.37  
The advantages of the family grape producing farm – low monitoring and supervision 
costs associated with labour, and the absence of incentives for land abuse – was 
accompanied by the growers’ limited ability to take advantage of the growing economies 
of scale in wine-production and their weakness in selling their produce. When production 
was simply for local consumption, these problems were unimportant for family growers. 
However, the rapid growth in California’s wine production after 1880 was not based on 
the expansion of rural, local markets, but rather with urban demand, especially in distant 
markets of New York, Chicago, and New Orleans (see below). The different advantages 
associated with the small family grape producer and large wine-making facilities were 
appreciated by Percy T. Morgan, the manager of the California Wine Association which, 
as we shall see, was the world’s largest wine company at this time.  Morgan, while noting 
in 1902 that merchants at that time were organizing ‘great vineyard companies with 
ample capital for the laying out and the planting of vast tracts of wines grapes’ went to on 
to note: 
But it is not from these great tracts that the larger portion of the tonnage for wine 
purposes will be derived. It is from the small vineyardist, cultivating from ten to fifty 
acres (four to twenty hectares); cultivating and looking after his lands individually, 
and thereby obtaining from 30% to 50% more tonnage to the acre than is possible 
from the great vineyard tracts, that the very remunerative results will accrue.38 
 
Morgan exaggerated the competiveness of the small farm, perhaps in part because his 
organisation would benefit most from an increase in the supply of grapes, but also 
because the support of grape producers, as numerically by far the largest sector of the 
industry, helped justify the CWA’s demands for import protection and Federal legislation 
                                                 
36 Tulveay Vineyard is excluded as no information is provided concerning whether it had wine-making 
facilities or not. 
37 (De Turk 1890) p.45. 
38  (Morgan 1902), p.95, which reproduces an earlier article in the Sacramento Bee. 
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to control adulteration and fraud. However there was no doubting that by the turn of the 
twentieth century the production of ordinary, standard wines (as oppose to fine wines) 
were best and most economically made in very large wineries.39 Change was happening 
fast, and although the 1891 survey reports over 600 wineries, Edward Adams wrote a few 
years later that there were only between 200 and 300 wine-makers that were ‘equipped 
with the plant necessary to produce good wine on any commercial scale’.40  The Pacific 
Wine and Spirits Review also noted that if previously nearly every vineyard had had its 
own fermenting house and storage cellar, by 1900 most growers sold their grapes to 
wine-makers, ‘except to a limited extent in some of the older districts’.41 By contrast the 
production of fine wines, as authors such as Husmann and Bioletti insisted, were best 
made in smaller cellars, ‘under the constant, watchful supervision of the proprietor, who 
must himself be an expert connoisseur in wines and must know just how to handle the 
product at every stage during, as well as after, its manufacture’.42 However these 
accounted for perhaps five per cent of the State’s production at the most. As economies 
of scale appeared in wine-making, new forms of organisation were required both to 
supply the grapes to wineries and to sell the much greater quantities of wine produced 
(section 4). 
 
3 Learning to grow grapes and make wine 
When the early settlers turned to viticulture in the Los Angeles region in the 1850s 
and 1860s, they found an adequate supply of fertile land, a disease free environment, and 
the Mission grape, which was cheap and easily to cultivate. Wine production could not 
have been easier, as George Husmann noted in 1883: 
The very ease of the pursuit, which allowed any one, even with the simplest culture 
and the most common treatment, to raise a fair crop and make a drinkable wine, has 
led many, in fact a large majority, to embark in grape growing who knew but little 
about it, and did not try to learn more.43 
 
                                                 
39 (Bioletti 1909), p.384. 
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 Husmann continued, however, by noting that ‘easy as are grape culture and wine 
making here, there is a vast field for improvement; and nowhere else perhaps are rational 
knowledge and proper skills more needed’.44 The task of producing a good wine in a hot 
climate that could be sold in distant markets was considerable, and involved more than 
simply changing the primitive methods of crushing grapes, or the lack of proper cellars. 
Growers such as Antoine Delmas, Charles Lefranc and Emile Dresel brought large 
quantities of cuttings in an attempt to find a more suitable grape variety than the Mission. 
The most publicized journey however was that which the Hungarian immigrant Agoston 
Haraszthy made in 1861, and who claimed to have collected in Europe 1,400 different 
grape varieties – perhaps 300 was more likely - and had 100,000 cuttings and rooted 
vines sent to his Buena Vista vineyard and winery at Sonoma.45 Growers’ resistance to 
change in those areas already planted was, as a number of writers noted, eroded by the 
spread of phylloxera that destroyed large numbers of Mission vines, which otherwise 
might have remained in production. The relative importance of the Mission variety also 
declined as growers started new vineyards using other varieties. According to Agoston 
Haraszthy’s son, Arpad, if the Mission variety accounted for about 80 per cent of 
California’s vine stock as late as 1880, by 1890 an estimated 90 per cent of the state’s 
wine grapes were of ‘the best foreign varieties’.46 However the transformation had only 
just started, as growers had now not only to match the right grape varieties with the soil 
and climatic conditions on each individual vineyard, a process that had evolved over 
centuries in Europe, but also to discover the best phylloxera resistant American rootstock 
for the European vines. As Professor (later Dean) Eugene W Hilgard of the University of 
California’s College of Agriculture noted in 1884, ‘among the most important and at the 
same time most difficult questions still to be settled for California viticulture, is the 
special adaptation of grape-varieties to local climates and soils, and to desirable blends; 
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46 Haraszthy, cited in (Carosso 1951), p.132. 
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and before these points are settled, many heavy losses and disappointments will be 
sustained.’47  As we have seen for Europe, there were economic incentives for growers to 
prefer grape varieties that were high yielding, rather than those that produced fine wines.  
 If the growing of grapes in a hot climate was easier than in cooler regions such as 
Champagne or Burgundy, wine-making presented considerably more problems. These 
difficulties were compounded by the fact that wine-makers in Europe were only just 
beginning to resolve the problems themselves. The first obstacle in California was the 
lack of practical knowledge about wine-making. As most Europeans – and all Germans – 
picked their grapes as late as possible, many Californian wine-makers initially did the 
same. Late picking maximizes the grape’s sugar content, an important consideration in 
northern Europe, but hardly a problem in the Los Angeles region, or indeed anywhere 
else in the state. Instead in hot climates growers needed to pick grapes early, to preserve 
their acidity, which would help to preserve the wine. Growers also had to learn not to mix 
ripe with unripe grapes, to exclude mouldy or rotten grapes, to choose an adequate sized 
vessel for fermentation, to clean and disinfect all the utensils, etc. Initially in California, 
as in Argentina, a large number of wine-makers invested heavily in equipment without 
fully understanding the basic problems involved in wine production.  
     One of the problems of making wines in hot climates was that the high sugar content 
and low in acidity of the grapes caused the fermentation to stick, with the remaining 
unfermented sugar making the wine unstable. The development of viticulture in the 
cooler coastal regions around San Francisco made it much easier, at least in theory, to 
produce dry wines. Indeed, as the hot and dry summers allowed the grapes to mature 
sufficiently, winemaking was easier than in Missouri and the Eastern States, or in central 
and northern Europe.48 George Husmann’s wines produced on the Talcoa Vineyard in 
Napa, were fully fermented after six days, and cleared enough to be sold to merchants six 
weeks later for maturing, and then shipped ‘as far East as Connecticut, when not more 
than a year old, and arrive in perfect condition’.49 Yet many wine growers were not so 
successful, and Eugene Hilgard, in his famous article in the San Francisco Examiner of 
August 8 1889, blamed the serious overproduction of the time on the poor quality of 
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wines being produced. According to Hilgard, the reasons for the poor wines included: (1) 
the wrong choice of grape varieties, (2) growers cultivating too large an area so that 
grapes were not harvested at the correct moment, (3) grapes not properly sorted prior to 
crushing, (4) fermentation tanks that were kept too full so that there was no room for a 
protective cover of carbon dioxide, (5) the use of excessively large fermentation tanks 
and hot grapes, and (6) improper handling of the fermentation and subsequent activities.50 
The solution for Hilgard was the development of scientific winemaking, and this could 
only be achieved through the construction of large industrial wineries.  
 Charles Wetmore, a leading member of the Board of State Viticultural 
Commissioners, strongly disagreed with Hilgard on the need for larger wineries and in 
particular the separation of grape-growing activities from wine-production. He believed 
that small wineries could produce fine wines, and that if grape growers stopped making 
their own wines, their economic incentives would be to use grape varieties that 
maximised output, rather than quality.51 Wetmore was right in the very long run, as today 
small wineries have access to both the human capital and technologies necessary to make 
fine wines. However, under the conditions of the late nineteenth century, when skilled 
oenologists and laboratories in wineries were very scarce, Hilgard was undoubtedly 
correct. In fact, the advantages of large wineries resulted more from improving the wine 
quality by using scientific production methods, than from the lower unit costs associated 
with the production process itself.52  
 The California wine industry switched from boom to bust on a number of 
occasions. After a period of rapid growth, which saw the number of vines increasing by 
50 per cent just between 1873 and 1876, the industry plunged into depression because of 
the difficulties associated with marketing outside California.53 In Napa, savings banks 
refused to make loans on vineyard property as they considered that vines did not increase 
the land’s value, and elsewhere farm animals were allowed to wander in the vineyards 
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before the vines were pulled up and sold for firewood.54 The recession was ended by 
phylloxera in France which led to a sharp increase in wine prices, and prosperity was 
reinforced by tariffs in 1874 and then again in 1883. Imports fell from 372 thousand 
hectolitres in 1873 to 129 thousand in 1885.55 Between 1877 and 1887, the area of vines 
in Sonoma Country increased from 2,800 to 8,780 hectares, while in Napa the increase 
was from 1,360 to 5,840 hectares. For Eugene Hilgard in 1884, only the appearance of 
phylloxera in California itself, and the impact of the Exclusion Act were obstacles to 
future growth.56 The boom lasted until 1886, when a large and inferior crop caused prices 
to collapse, and supply then remained strong in successive harvests because of the 
excessive plantings in the early 1880s.57 Although wine production had undoubtedly 
improved in California, a significant amount of cheap and adulterated wines were present 
in the major markets, and the price differential between quality and quantity wines was 
reduced. Charles Wetmore noted in 1894 that ‘the man who gets ten tons of grapes to the 
acre gets 10 cents for wine; the man, who on a steep hillside, gets two tons and a half, 
gets 12 cents; and the 12-cent wine is mixed with the 10-cent’.58 Some growers 
responded to low prices by grafting high-yield, low-quality varieties on their better vines, 
while others carried out only the minimum operations necessary, leading to disease 
running ‘unchecked in vineyards’. Over 12,000 hectares of vines were uprooted in the 
early 1890s.59 The problems affected the whole industry, but especially those that had 
invested vast sums in their asset specific wine-making installation, as George Husmann 
noted in the 1896 edition of his book: 
It was very clear to them that their immense storage houses, casks and machinery, and 
all the capital it had cost to build up their trade, would be wholly unremunerative if 
the vineyards died out, and they would be in worse plight than the producers, who 
had at least their lands, to cultivate in some other crops.60  
 
The wine crisis resulting from the panic of 1886 continued well into the 1890s as the 
economy suffered a severe downturn of 1893. As the established banks refused to lend on 
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wine, an attempt was made to create a grape-growers’ and wine merchants’ bank, but this 
failed because of its inability to raise finance, but also because of the growing distrust 
between the two sides of the industry.61 As the wine makers responded to the crisis by 
cutting prices and reducing purchases, the growers blamed them as the main cause of 
their economic plight. Professor Hilgard, as others, proposed district co-operatives for 
labelling, bottling and marketing wine, and criticized the wine-makers and merchants for 
emphasis on ‘pretty bottles and beautiful labels’, rather than attempting to improve 
quality.62 The presence of large quantities of bad wines produced by poor production 
techniques, and the supposedly widespread fraud and adulteration of California’s wines, 
and the 1893 depression, were considered as major causes of the problems facing the 
sector, just as they would be in the Midi in the following decade. These problems were 
resolved in California however, in a very different manner to the Midi.   
 
4 Markets, vertical coordination and the fight against adulteration 
There were four major economic groups found in the wine trade in the late nineteenth 
century: the Californian grape producers, the wine-makers, San Francisco shippers and 
the East Coast bottlers and distributors. The development of new markets after 1880 
created incentives to expand production, but new coordination arrangements were 
required between the different links if an adequate return on the high levels of capital 
investment now required was to be achieved. In particular, commercial growers needed a 
market for their grapes; wine-makers a supply of grapes to benefit from the potential 
economies of scale associated with the new wine-making equipment and a ready market 
for the wine; and the local merchants found it necessary to maintain their competitive 
position and stop out of State merchants dealing directly with local producers. These 
problems were not dissimilar to those found in Europe at this time, but they were solved 
in very different ways. Given the weak bargaining power of economic agents in the 
Californian wine-industry to obtain concessions from government to create new 
institutions to protect small producers such as happened in Europe, attempts were made 
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to integrate ownership and achieve a high degree of vertical control for the industry from 
grape production through to market distribution.  
The great boom in viticulture between 1880 and 1885 was sandwiched between two 
periods of depression between 1875 and 1875, and 1886 and 1895.  As elsewhere in the 
wine world, periods of shortage saw prices increase rapidly and left merchants without 
stock, while at times of overproduction, growers found it difficult to sell, and lacked the 
facilities to adequately store the wine. The relatively high percentage of growers that had 
no wine-making facilities (around four-fifths in 1891) made them particularly vulnerable, 
and the Pacific Rural Press in 1894 claimed they depended on ‘three or four firms of San 
Francisco’ for their livelihood. This grower’s newspaper argued that ‘a large percentage’ 
of the approximately fifty million dollars invested in the wine industry belonged to the 
‘growers and producers’, so that the merchants proposal to buy wines after the 1893 
harvest at five or six cents per gallon gave a return on capital of just ‘two and one-half 
per cent’, leaving growers nothing for ‘labor and expenses’. Despite these low prices, the 
Pacific Rural Press claimed there was ‘no overproduction of wine in this State, unless it 
be in the “brick vineyards” of San Francisco’, and concluded that:  
The weaker growers have been forced out of existence, while the stronger have as a 
matter of self-protection been forced to become distributors of their own wine, and as 
they do not use salicylic acid or aniline dies, which analysis shows some of the 
dealers are doing, they are building up a trade that the dealers cannot take from them 
with their cut prices’. 63 
 
The proposed solution by the growers and wine-makers was a combine which would 
allow them to pool their products, and give them absolute control over the production and 
marketing. The original idea was to contract for the output of growers for a term of years, 
with prices increasing over time, and with the contracts becoming binding when seventy 
five percent of the total acreage of wine grapes had been secured (see appendix for 
details).64 Thanks to the agreement of the several hundred larger growers, this quantity 
representing dry wine production was achieved, and California Wine-Makers Corporation 
(CWMC) was established in 1894. Within a few months the price of ordinary wine 
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increased from 6 cents to 12½ cents per gallon, in part because the CWMC was allowed 
good credit facilities, and in part by the small harvest of 1894.65 To sell the wine, the 
CWMC entered into a five year agreement with the California Wine Association (CWA), 
an organisation also created in 1894 by the leading West Coast wine dealers (see below). 
Post-contractual opportunistic behaviour quickly appeared when harvests returned to 
normality and lower prices followed. By the summer of 1897 a ‘wine war’ had broken 
out between the two rival organisations, caused by the fact that the CWA refused to pay 
the prices demanded by the CWMA, and the CWMA in violation of the contract, sold 
large quantities of wine directly to the New York house of A. Marshall & Co.  Although 
the CWMC perhaps controlled 80 per cent of the state’s wine-producers by 1897, the 
CWA had 80 per cent of the wine produced,66 and the legal defeat for failing to honour 
the initial agreement, saw the CWMC effectively disappear in 1899.67 Attempts were 
made almost immediately by Henry J Crocker, the ex president of the CWMC to start a 
new organisation. He circulated over 1400 letters to the State’s grape-growers, and noted 
that: 
I propose to make an attempt to assure to the grape growers a fixed price annually for 
his product, and thus remove him from the uncertainties of a fluctuating market. 
The average price of grapes for the past ten years has been $10.50 per ton. With 
absolute control I feel such confidence in my ability to increase this value that I will 
pay you cash on delivery $14 per ton for all the standard varieties and $12 per ton for 
Missions and Malvasias. 
Contracts will be made separately with each individual grape grower, and, should I 
secure enough contacts to make the project feasible, I feel assured that the capital 
which was interested in the success of the wine makers will gladly come forward in 
the grape growers’ interest, and the result will be a benefit to the various branches of 
the industry. If I fail to secure the contracts I will be compelled to drop the project.68 
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Contracts were to be for seven years, and Crocker demanded a minimum of 80 per 
cent of the State’s wine grapes. The Pacific Rural Press noted that these grape prices 
could only be achieved if merchants paid artificially high prices for their wine, and that, 
with the exception of raisins, no other combine had been able to attract 80 per cent of the 
crop.69 Crocker’s project also failed because of the diversity of the growers’ interests. 
One problem was that of assessing grape quality, especially as many of the smaller 
producers were beginning to plant shy-bearing European varieties on the hills rather than 
plains which produced small quantities of quality wine.  Another was that any 
organisation which monopolised grape production would naturally look to use the best 
wine making facilities available in the State. Technology was beginning to change 
rapidly in the wineries and those small growers that possessed older wine-making 
facilities feared as a result that their facilities would become redundant, and they would 
cease to be wine-makers.70 Finally, many growers without winemaking facilities resented 
being locked into contracts so long, especially as in the short-term they were benefiting 
from the competition between three major buyers: the CWA, Lachman & Jacobi, and the 
Italian-Swiss Company.71 It would not last. 
In January 1904, Percy T. Morgan noted that the ‘quality and general excellence’ of 
California’s wines were ‘no longer in question’ but that per capita wine consumption in 
the United States was less than a fiftieth of that in ‘wine drinking countries like France 
and Italy’.  He claimed that ‘almost every rolling hill and fertile valley of California 
could be profitably covered with vines’, so that the future of the industry was 
‘principally, if not entirely, dependent upon an expanding market.’72 Morgan did not have 
to worry about foreign competition, as the rapid growth in the Californian wine industry 
between the late 1870s and 1880s had taken place against a background of wine shortages 
in France because of phylloxera, and high US import duties on foreign wines in 1874 and 
again in 1883. Exports of French wines to the United States declined from 236 thousand 
hectolitres in 1873 to 23 thousand in 1889, while California’s production increased from 
95 thousand to 587 thousand hectolitres, and exports out of the state rose from 19 to 310 
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thousand hectolitres, between the two dates.73 As Carlo Cipolla noted, the character of the 
Californian wine industry changed dramatically at this time, so that, while at the end on 
the seventies, two-thirds of Californian wine production was for the local market, the 
figure had dropped to only ten per cent by the end of the nineties.74 
Yet by all accounts, the supremacy of California’s wines in the domestic market had 
yet to be appreciated by the country’s drinkers. California growers and merchants 
complained that their best wines were sold under foreign labels, and the poorer wines, 
together with those from every other wine producing state in the country, under the 
California brand. According to the Pacific Wine & Spirits Review (hereafter PWSR): 
Heretofore the greater part of California’s best wines have gone to the Eastern 
markets in bulk and they have been sold to hotels, cafes and high-class bars, only to 
appear under French labels, while the commoner wines have gone into consumption 
as the products of California … In other words ….if California wines of the higher 
class had not largely masqueraded under foreign labels, the industry would have had a 
far greater development.75 
 
The motives, as one writer at the end of the nineteenth century noted, were obvious: 
A bottle of wine, which as domestic, could be sold at a good profit for fifty cents, 
with no extra expense except the affixing of a new label, may bring, as imported, a 
dollar and a half, and the customer be just as well pleased and as well served. Labels 
of all known brands, with imitations of special corks, bottles, or other peculiarities, 
are kept constantly in stock in all cities, at trifling cost, to be used for this purpose.76 
 
Another problem was the presence of adulteration in California itself, as producers 
turned to the chemist not to just to improve wine quality, but to cover their errors. 
According to the Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture in 1887, wine adulteration 
‘has increased in amount and in the skillfulness of its practitioners until at the present day 
it requires for its detection all the knowledge and resources which chemical science can 
bring to bear upon it, and even then a large part doubtless escapes detection’.77 
Adulteration was the consequence of poor wine-making techniques in general, although 
every wine-maker could experience problems in a ‘difficult’ year. 
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Yet there were also other interests at stake. When the CWMC signed a deal with A. 
Marshall & Co. of New York in 1897 for a million gallons of wine and an option on 
another one and half million, it excluded the powerful San Francisco merchants from the 
trade, and allowed a powerful outside merchant direct access to wine-makers. The 
response of the CWA was reduce its own wine prices, with the object of discouraging 
Marshall and other Eastern dealers, from competing directly with the large California 
wine houses for supplies.78  
As elsewhere in the wine world, there were therefore considerable incentives for 
growers, wine-makers and merchants to try and control fraud, improve prices and exert 
greater control over the selling of their wines and the use of the ‘California brand’. These 
concerns inevitably coincided with the low wine prices and glutted markets of the late 
1880s and early 1890s, but the low population density and the distance between producer 
and consumer led to very different solutions in California compared to the Old Continent. 
The problems associated with wine adulteration were solved by three inter-connected 
strategies: horizontal consolidation and vertical integration; the Pure Food & Drugs Act 
of 1906; and the tax reform for brandy in 1891. We shall look at each in turn. 
As early as 1862 Agoston Haraszthy had proposed that the California wine industry 
fund an agent in San Francisco to organize the sale of the state’s wines, and vouch for 
their authenticity.79 In 1872, a joint-stock association, the Napa Valley Wine Company 
was formed to promote the region’s wine in the Eastern cities.80  In San Francisco itself 
the Board of State Viticultural Commissioners sponsored in 1888 a permanent exhibition 
which allowed consumers to purchase local branded wines, and there were discussions to 
open similar ones in New York, Chicago and even London.81 Yet the problems of 
controlling wine sales on the other side of the Continent only really began to be tackled 
when, in August 1894, seven of the state’s largest wine firms created the California Wine 
Association (CWA), a corporation with a capital stock of $10 million.82 All the assets of 
the seven wine houses were turned over to the Association, although wine would still be 
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sold under some of their labels and trademarks. In 1900, the CWA acquired half interests 
in the three largest independent wine houses still remaining, and continued to buy up 
other wineries. The CWA quickly recovered from the loss of a considerable quantity of 
its stocks in the San Francisco fire of 1906, and in the same year work started on a huge 
wine complex called Winehaven on a 19 hectare site at Richmond, which had storage for 
some 378,500 hectolitres, or about 25 per cent of California’s output, and wine 
manufacturing facilities for 140,000 hectolitres.83 According to a recent history of the 
organisation, between 1894 and Prohibition (1919), the CWA would ‘cultivate more 
vineyard acreage, crush more grapes annually, operate more wineries, make more wine, 
and have a greater wine storage capacity than any other wine concern in the world’.84 
This was horizontal consolidation and vertical integration – from grape growing to 
distribution – on a massive scale. 
By the 1890s it was claimed that there were rapid advances in improving the quality 
of California wines, in part because of the successful planting of better grape varieties in 
adequate locations, but also because winemaking was being conducted more 
scientifically.85 Lachman noted in 1903 that, ‘in the last eight years rapid progress has 
been made in the manufacture and maturing of wines, wine making having been 
conducted on more scientific lines’, and the Pacific Wine and Spirit Review a few years 
noted the improvements in wine quality with the separation of the wine-making from the 
grape production.86 Although neither of the comments is completely objective - Lachman 
was a director of the CWA’s and its chief taster, and the PWSR was also dependent on 
the organization - it was claimed that the Association never produced a bad wine, 
although neither did it produce an outstanding one.87 The general improvement in the 
reputation of California’s wines also allowed small independent wineries to begin to 
specialize in fine wines for niche markets, with the smaller Napa wineries such as 
Inglenook, Charles Krug, Beringer and Salmina (Larkmead) consistently taking awards 
and bottling their best wines with labels displaying ‘Napa’ as their appellation.88 The 
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Pacific Rural Press in 1901 claimed that fine wines accounted for five or ten per cent of 
the State’s output.89 However, while California’s wine production increased by a factor of 
four between 1891/3 and 1911/4, dry table wines increased by just a third, and dessert 
wine production multiplied by a factor of nine.  
In general the CWA brought greater stability to the market, and California probably 
suffered less during the turbulent 1900s than any other wine growing region in the world,  
even if the CWA failed to buy grapes in 1908. Indeed, as Figure 1 shows, growers appear 
sufficiently confident to have significantly increased output during this decade, and Percy 
Morgan, for many years the CWA’s chairman, noted in 1917 that forward integration had 
help to create new markets for California’s wines: 
Until the coming of the California Wine Association only a few wineries tried to 
deliver their original packages direct to the consumer and build up a following for 
their label. The large dealer almost always sold California wines in bulk to distant 
jobbers who either bottled them with a domestic or foreign label known to their 
particular localities, or sold them to retailers who pursued a similar course. Moreover, 
these distributors and retailers had neither the knowledge not the facilities to age and 
handle wines properly. Only a large firm with capital could select from millions of 
gallons, blend to standards, market under labels that could gain the confidence of the 
public, and stand back of the label whenever sold.90 
 
A number of reasons can be cited for why horizontal consolidation and vertical 
integration on this massive scale was chosen as a means of controlling quality in the US 
market. In the first instance, the distance between California and its major markets (New 
York, New Orleans, and Chicago) was significant. It could be argued that the Midi or 
Algerian producers also faced problems of distance in France when they sold their wines 
in Paris and the industrial north, but in this case they were selling to consumers already 
accustomed to wine drinking. California, by contrast, had to create new markets, and in 
this case the comparison should be with selling French or Spanish wine to the reluctant 
wine drinkers in London, rather than Paris. A second point was the limited political 
influence of the sector in the United States, which in any case was desperately trying to 
fight Prohibition. While French politicians would ignore the demands of the growers at 
their peril, this was not true in California. A final point is the heavy capital investment 
                                                 
89 (Pacific Rural Press), Dec.14, 1901, p.372. 
90 Percy Morgan, 1917, cited in (Peninou and Unzelman 2000), p.125. See also p.94. 
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and asset specific nature of this technology made wine-production one of many sectors 
that participated in the ‘Great Merger Movement’. It was in the mass-production 
industries, where no single firm had a clear-cut advantage over the rest, which suffered 
most during the depression of the 1890s in the United States. According to Naomi 
Lamoreaux, consolidations became common to escape price competition in certain types 
of industries, namely the ‘capital-intensive, mass-production industries in which firms 
were closely matched and in which expansion had been rapid on the eve of the Panic of 
1893’.91 This description matched that of the California wine industry at this time. Most 
of the large, capital-intensive wineries had been constructed only a few years earlier, and 
the possibilities of collusion in the wine market was very difficult. One important 
consideration in the case of the CWA was the need to establish its own distribution 
networks. Although the information of the United States is limited, retail wine prices fell 
much less in the major centres of consumption such as Paris or Buenos Aires than in the 
centres of wine-production. By integrating forwards and controlling distribution, wine-
makers could both obtain higher prices and guarantee a market for their wines. This 
helped provide the market stability for the group to invest in brand names. 
Yet although vertical integration helped the CWA to control quality, large quantities 
of California wines were still reportedly being sold under foreign labels, and poor quality 
wines of dubious origin, such as those that the Pacific Wine and Spirits Review dubbed as 
from Ohio’s ‘brick vineyards’, were sold under the California brand and damaged the 
state’s reputation. The Federal Pure Food and Drugs Act was therefore particularly 
welcomed by the CWA, although as this covered only inter-state trade, it was still 
possible to legally ship a barrel labelled ‘poison’ between two states, and then sell it as 
wine, if the destination state had not passed its own pure food law.92  
What was considered a fraud and what was considered as legitimate remained very 
parochial as we have seen in this book. At the same time that the PWSR criticised Ohio’s 
‘brick vineyards’, it also noted that ‘more than 2,000,000 bottles of genuine champagne 
are now annually produced in the United States’.93 California wines that were described 
                                                 
91  (Lamoreaux 1985), pp.45 and 87. 
92 (Pacific Wine & Spirits Review), May 1907, p.14. 
93 (Pacific Wine & Spirits Review), May, 1907, p.39. 
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as a particular French type such as ‘Burgundy’ or ‘Champagne’, were rejected for the 
Paris Exposition of 1900.  
 
Figure 2 
California production of dry and dessert wines, 1891-
191394
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The third major factor in improving quality was the legislation that allowed 
California’s wine makers to fortify their wines with domestic grape brandy and not pay 
the $1.10 a gallon tax on brandy. This made fortified wines the cheapest form of alcohol 
on the market, and allowed producers to profitably distil their unstable wines and produce 
sweet fortified wines.95 It also implied that they did not have resolve the technical 
problems associated with making wines in a hot climate, and therefore was especially 
                                                 
94 (California. State Board of Agricultural 1912), p.191 and  (California. State Agricultural Society 1915),  
p.139. 
95  Seff and Cooney, in (Muscatine, Amerine, and Thompson 1984), p.418. 
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attractive to producers in the Central Valley. From 1891, there was a rapid growth in the 
production of dessert wines, and by 1913, they accounted for 45 per cent of all 
California’s production (although not all was produced in the south), of which 46 per cent 
was classified as port, 31 per cent as sherry, 12 per cent as muscatel, and nine per cent 
angelica, a wine named after Los Angeles (Figure 2).96 
 
 
Conclusion. 
 Just as in many other branches of California’s agriculture, the wine industry prior 
to 1914 can be considered a success story. It is true that despite the rapid increase in 
production, annual consumption was just 2.12 litres per capita in the United States, and 
remained very low compared to other producer countries. Even though consumption in 
California itself perhaps increased from about 23 litres per capita in the 1880s and 1890s, 
to 40 litres in the mid-1900s, the figure was still less than the 60 litres found in Argentina 
or Chile.97 However, the industry had made major strides in both improving quality and 
market organisation. At the College of Agriculture the work of individuals such as 
Eugene Hilgard and Frederic Bioletti was important to help growers tackle phylloxera 
and improve wine-making. On the eve of the First World War, California was part of the 
international scientific network that included research institutes in the Midi, Algeria and 
Australia. The difficulties associated with dry wine-making in hot countries were only 
beginning to be resolved by 1914, but by this date a winery with adequate facilities and 
the correct expertise was able to produce an acceptable beverage wine. Prohibition ended 
much of this research, and the considerable human capital that had accumulated in the 
state’s vineyards and wineries over the previous quarter century was lost, contributing to 
the delay not just in California but the New World in general, to the development of 
suitable wines for the European markets.98 
                                                 
96Angelica was fortified grape juice rather than a wine. Calculated from the (California. State Agricultural 
Society 1915), p.140. 
97 1878/82 - 24 litres and 1888/92 - 22 litres. My calculation from (Cipolla 1975), Table 2. 1907 – 40 litres.. 
Figures are very approximate.  
98 It is true that grapes continued to be produced for grape juice, raisin, and table grapes, but different 
varieties were used.  
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What makes California very different to other wine regions in this period however 
was the major consolidation of the leading firms in the CWA, and the degree of vertical 
integration of wine-making and distribution. By integrating forward and establishing 
distribution channels in the main markets, the CWA could sell branded wines in bottles 
direct to retailers, and guarantee that they had not been adulterated. The fact that these 
wines were ordinary beverage wines rather than fine wines increases, rather than 
diminishes the achievement. As discussed elsewhere, high prices allowed the marketing 
of small quantities of carefully differentiated, high-quality fine wines such as champagne 
or claret through the traditional retail market in the British market.99 The marketing 
problems associated with the creation of a mass-market for cheap wines were very 
different. The CWA appears to have had considerable success in producing a drinkable 
wine to sell among consumers who had originated from Europe’s wine producing 
regions, but was less successful in creating new markets, especially outside the major 
centres of New York, Chicago or New Orleans. There is little doubt that the CWA used 
its market power to fix grape and wine prices, but the rapid growth in the industry 
between 1894 and 1914 also suggests that all sectors of the industry benefited to some 
degree. Indeed, given the alternative market conditions for growers prevailing in all wine 
countries in the 1900s, those of California seem to have done comparatively well. The 
years of greatest difficulties in California wine-industry date from the late 1880s and 
early 1890s, immediately prior to the founding of the CWA, rather than the 1900s. 
The California model did have important implications, In particular, while the Federal 
Government was willing to keep prices high with import tariffs, and the Pure Food and 
Drugs Act provided the legislative framework to control adulteration, neither it, not the 
State legislature, were going to legislate as willing as the European governments were, 
because their growers lacked the political muscle of this in Europe. It was the CWA that 
negotiated on behalf of the industry, and while its own interest often coincided with the 
independent growers, they were not identical. 
Californians had to relearn wine after ending of Prohibition in 1933, as there was a 
significant loss of knowledge concerning viticulture, wine-making, and the appreciation 
of fine wines. Large areas of premium varieties had either been uprooted, or grafted with 
                                                 
99 (Simpson 2004). 
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poor quality heavy bearers for the table. Wines were made by untrained winemakers in 
unsanitary conditions, leading W.V.Cruess to note that ‘after Repeal, the outstanding 
characteristic of our wines was instability’.100 Sweet wines outsold dry wine three to one 
following repeal, and, as consumers had very little experience of drinking wines, any 
judgement about wine quality was ‘practically impossible’.101 In the words of James 
Lapsley, between the 1930s and 1980s ‘the public’s expectation of “wine” shifted from a 
fortified, often oxidizes or spoilt beverage, produced from indistinct grape varieties, to a 
table wine possessing distinct flavour attributes derived from varietal grapes and from 
processing’.102 
 These challenges were not dissimilar to those facing the industry in the 1880s, but 
the response was slightly different. The University of Davis to provide the scientific 
work, with a significant part of their research being directed towards understanding basic 
viticulture and viniculture practices associated with producing fine wines, rather than the 
vastly more important ordinary table and dessert wines. Local growers associations such 
as the Napa Valley Wine Technical Group provided practical help, and fine wine 
producers turned to varietal and geographical labelling to differentiate their wines from 
the cheaper ones that were sold using European place names (‘California claret’, etc.). I 
Instead of a highly integrated Californian firm such as the CWA that dominated the 
national wine market, out-of-state bottlers and distilleries moved into the area in early 
1940s to purchase local wine-making businesses to guarantee supplies for the East Coast 
as the industry changed from the producer of ‘a bulk commodity’ to a business that was 
‘predominately brand oriented’.103 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
100  Cited in (Lapsley 1996), p.51. 
101 (Lapsley 1996), p.3. 
102 (Lapsley 1996), p.1. 
103 (Lapsley 1996) pp.95 and 110. 
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Appendix 1. 
 
Proposed contract for growers offered by the California Wine-Makers Corporation 
 
Five year price schedule 
 
  GRAPES price per ton   WINE per gallon   
     1st year  3rd,4th, 5th year  Ist year  3rd,4th, 5th year 
Varieties of from from  from from   from from  from from  
Grapes bottom hill bottom hill  bottom hill bottom hill 
 land land  land land   land land  land land  
Zinfandel           
Mataro          
Grenache          
Carigan          
Charbono $9.0  $11.0 $14.0 $18.0  9 cents 11 cents 14 cents 18 cents 
Chasselas          
Grey Riesling          
Blaue Elbing          
Burger          
          
Franken Riesling           
Johan Riesling          
Sauvignon Vert          
Colombar          
Pinor $13.50  $16.0 $19.0 $23.0  13.5 cents 16 cents 19 cents 23 cents 
Folle Blanche          
Mondeuse          
Pfeffers Cabernet          
St.Macaire          
          
Cabernet Sauvignon           
Cabernet Franc          
Merlot          
Verdot $20.0  $25.0 $25.0 $35.0  20 cents 25 cents 25 cetns 35 cents 
Semillon          
Sauvignon Blanc          
Malbec          
          
Misson           
Malvasia $8.0  $8.0 $8.0 $8.0  8 cents 8 cents 8 cents 8 cents 
 
Sound wines now in cellar at 10 cents per gallon, except those in the second and third 
categories, which will be values by expert arbitration and taken at that rate. 
All grapes to be sound and to have at least 22 per cent sugar, and to be delivered at the 
wineries of the purchasers in the county. Any deficiency in sugar will be deducted as 
follows: 
 Fifty cents per ton less than schedule price for each degree of sugar bellow 22 
degrees (Balling) and down to 20 degrees. 
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 One dollar per ton for every degree of sugar less than 20 degrees (Balling). 
All wines to be delivers at a railway terminal point. 
Payments to be made as follows: one –third immediately after receipt of goods; one-third 
by three months acceptance, and one-third by six months acceptance. 
All wines to contain at least 11 per cent alcohol (by volume). 
All future wines to be accepted on or before December 31st of each year, and to be 
removed by the first day of March following. Should any wines remain in the hands of the 
seller March 1st, the purchaser will pay the owner of such wines one-quarter of a cent per 
gallon more for every month after March 1st such wine is stored. 
All packages for shipment to be furnished by the seller and to be returned promptly by the 
purchaser, well rinsed and sulphured. 
Pacific Rural Press, July 28 1894, p50. 
 
Contract. 
In consideration of $1, the receipt of which is herby acknowledged to --- paid by 
P.C.Rossi, --- hereby agree to sell to him or his assigns, at his or their option, at any time 
between this date and  ---- next, the following viticultural products, viz., --- tons of 
grapes, --- gallons of wine, more or less, the particulars of which are enumerated below, 
at the prices and on the terms set forth in the printed schedule hereto annexed. If this 
option be exercised by the purchaser he must notify --- in writing of such exercise of it on 
or before the --- next, and the same shall thereupon become a sale binding on both 
parties. 
The grapes above contracted for are the crop now growing on --- vineyard, called ---, at -
--, of which --- acres are ---, and the quantity above names is the estimate product of said 
vines. If the product does not prove to be so – not to be responsible for any deficiency. If 
it exceeds the quantity names such excess is included in the sale. 
The wine above referred to consists of about --- gallons. 
This option is granted and accepted on condition that if it be exercised by the grantee he 
is to be deemed thereby to contract to buy from --- as --- hereby contract to sell him --- 
crop of the same premises for the years 1895, 1896, 1897 and 1898 on the same 
conditions herein set forth, and at the prices fixed for those years respectively in the 
printed schedule annexed hereto. 
Witness --- hand this – day of ---, 1894. 
 
 
Pacific Rural Press, June 23 1894, p406. 
 
Grape and wine prices for the second year were roughly in between those for the first and 
third years. There is no evidence that these contracts were actually used. The 
increase in prices over five years required growers enjoying a monopoly on 
supply, and the detailed price schedule was too complicated to be used. 
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